This paper investigates the market structure of Arab GCC banking industry during the years of 1993 to 2002 using the most frequently applied measures of concentration kbank concentration ratio (CRk) and Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) and evaluates the monopoly power of banks over the ten years period using the "H statistic" by Panzar and Rosse. The results show that Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and UAE have moderately concentrated markets and are moving to less concentrated positions. The measures of concentration also show that Qatar, Bahrain and Oman are highly concentrated markets. The Panzar-Rosse H-statistics suggest that banks in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAE operate under perfect competition; banks in Bahrain and Qatar operate under conditions of monopolistic competition; and we are unable to reject monopolistic competition for the banking market in Oman.
Introduction
The Gulf Cooperation Council's (GCC) 1 economies share a number of common features. These economies are characterized by large oil producing sectors, dependency on oil exports, stable currencies and stable price levels. Similarities also extend to geography, longstanding cultural and political ties, a common language, high living standards and coordinated policies. These similarities by far outweigh any differences.
The last 30 years have seen significant structural change in the GCC financial markets. In particular, policies of financial liberalization and financial restructuring were implemented with the goal of enhancing competitiveness in the banking sector.
These policies beg the following questions: how large are the banking markets in these six countries? What is the structure of the banking market? Is the concentration in these markets increasing or decreasing?
Studies of competitive conditions in the developed economies banking markets are commonplace, there have been relatively few studies conducted for the GCC economies 2 and no empirical work of a specialist nature. This paper investigates the market structure of the GCC banking industry in the decade to 2002 with the aim of evaluating the monopoly power of the banks over this period. The paper aims to test the relationship between the market structure and the competitive conditions of the banks in these six economies using the most frequently applied measures of concentrations; namely the k-bank concentration ratio (CRk) and HerfindahlHirschman Index (HHI) to measure concentration, and the H-statistic of the PanzarRosse model to measure monopoly power.
The rest of the paper has the following structure: section two provides a background to the banking system in the GCC countries. Section three discusses measures of market structure and concentration. Section four presents the empirical result for the competitive conditions in these markets. The final section concludes.
The GCC Banking Sector
The banking industry in the GCC countries is relatively young, with the oldest banks dating back to no earlier than the 1950s. Although the majority are privately owned, the role of the public sector remains substantial. Whether through equity participation in several banks or through a number of governments owned specialized credit institutions that provide financing to public and private sector enterprises at subsidized rates, the public sector continues to have a prominent role in the banking industry of the GCC countries. Private sector ownership of financial institutions also tends to be concentrated in a few shareholders; a matter that reduces the threats (and benefits) of the market for corporate control.
Considering the region's massive oil wealth, the combined Tier One capital of the GCC's Top 50 banks at $31.5 billion is relatively small, amounting to 1.7% of the capital of the Top 1000 world banks. The capital of all 50 GCC banks is considerably less than that of HSBC (Hong Kong Shanghai Banking Corporation) Holdings at $35 billion. While GCC banks have been able to receive the highest rating of any bank in the Arab world or the emerging markets, the GCC has not been able to produce large powerhouse institutions that could be a force in the Arab or international banking arena. For number of reasons, many of them political, the global trend towards consolidation has by-passed the Gulf. However, with World Trade Organisation (WTO) liberalisation planned for the near future, banks will be reconsidering their 2 Salem-Ghanem et. al. (2002) examines concentration and equates concentration with lack of competitive strategies. As a recent report in the Banker stated, "GCC banks need to strengthen their position through consolidation in order to compete effectively with international banks. The current fragmented banking sector will be unable to put up a good fight when markets do eventually open up" (The Banker, 2002) .
A key assumption in quantitative analysis of banking is that the banks examined have to be relatively homogenous, provide similar services and use similar resources. Commercial banks operating in GCC are depository institutions that cannot take part in the leasing and trading of real goods for commercial purposes. In contrast, development and investment banks can engage in such activities, but they cannot accept deposits. These non-depository institutions also do not extend small commercial and individual loans, which require a substantial amount of investment in a brick-and-mortar branching network, work force, and regulatory compliance. In fact, they are mostly single branch banks that finance large long-term projects.
Because of their small market share in the sector as well as quite different technology, structure and goal, this study excludes development and investment banks and instead concentrates on commercial and Islamic banks.
The data is obtained from financial statements of banks, on their web pages on the internet, annual central bank reports, and from the Fitch-IBCA Ltd Bankscope CD Rom. This study covers 52 banks privately held and domestically owned that are fully licensed commercial. 5 banking market but a higher number of banks per unit of asset and a larger number of branches. 
Measuring market structure
There are a number of measures of concentration that have been used in banking studies. Hall and Tideman (1967) suggested a list of six desirable properties for measures of concentration. These are:
1. A concentration index should be a one-dimensional measure.
2. Concentration in an industry should be independent of the size of that industry.
3. Concentration should increase if the share of any firm is increased at the expense of a smaller firm.
4. If all firms are divided into K equal parts then the concentration index should be reduced by a proportion 1/K. 3 The sample period for UAE banks covers from 1995-2002. 5. If all firms are divided into N equal parts then the concentration should be a decreasing function of N.
6. A concentration measure should be between zero and one.
In a review of 73 US Structure-Conduct-Performance studies in banking from 1961 to 1991, Molyneux et al. (1996a) report that in 37 studies, the 3-bank deposit concentration measure was used. The second most frequently used is the HerfindahlHirschman Index (HHI -18 studies) followed by the number of firms in the market.
Following the steps of previous researchers and due to the limited number of banks in GCC, this paper will use the highest 2 &3 bank deposits as well as HerfindahlHirschman Index (HHI) for deposits as a measure of market structure.
The theoretical links between the measures of concentration used in this paper and market power have been explored by a number of researchers. Cowling and Waterson (1976) , Dansby and Wilig (1979) and Novshek (1980) Index. Similarly, a dominant cartel of k firms with a competitive fringe generates equilibrium price-cost margins related to the k-firm concentration index (Saving 1970 ).
Both simplicity and limited data requirements make the k bank concentration ratio one of the most frequently used measures of concentration in the empirical literature. Summing only the market shares of the k largest banks in the market, it takes the form:
The index gives equal emphasis to the k leading banks, but neglects the many small banks in the market. There is no rule for the determination of the value of k, so that the number of banks included in the concentration index is a somewhat arbitrary decision. The concentration ratio may be considered as one point on the concentration curve, and it is a one-dimensional measure ranging between zero and unity. The index approaches zero for an infinite number of equally sized banks (given that the k chosen for the calculation of the concentration ratio is comparatively small when compared to the total number of banks) and it equals unity if the banks included in the calculation of the concentration ratio make up the entire industry.
Since 1982, the U.S Department of Justice has based its merger guidelines on the HHI. This measure, which is also used by bank regulatory agencies, is calculated by squaring the market share of each firm competing in a defined geographic banking market and then summing the squares. The HHI can range from zero in a market having an infinite number of firms to 10,000 in a market having just one firm (with a 100 per cent market share). The HHI is a static measure and, therefore, gauges market concentration at a single point in time. Algebraically, it is:
where MS is the market share of the i th firm and n is number of firms in the market.
The index stresses the importance of larger banks by assigning them a greater weight than smaller banks, and it incorporates each bank individually, so that arbitrary cutoffs and insensitivity to the share distribution are avoided.
Based on the number of national banks in each of the six countries, we expect that the 2-bank deposits, 3-bank deposits and HHI value for testing the market structure in GCC markets will give indications that Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and UAE markets could be described as 'unconcentrated markets', while markets for Bahrain,
Oman and Qatar could be described as 'concentrated markets'. Arabia and UAE markets could be described as 'moderately concentrated markets'. CR2 1995 CR2 2002 CR3 1995 CR3 2002 HHI 1995 HHI 2002 Saudi Arabia The HHI and CRk measures show that the Qatar, Oman and Bahrain banking sectors are heavily concentrated. The natural policy concern is the welfare loss from noncompetitive pricing that could more than offset any presumed benefit associated with mergers or with the existence of large institutions. Other economic concerns about concentrated markets relate to the effectiveness of central bank policy, the increased probability of systemic risk and possible reduction in lending to the small and medium corporations 5 . The view on the relationship between competition and market structure is based on the traditional monopoly power hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, more concentrated markets tend to be more collusive and banks earn monopolistic profits by working with a wider margin of intermediation. These arguments are called 'Structural Models' because they are based on the structure of the banking market 6 and are challenged by other theoretical approaches. In reaction to the theoretical and empirical deficiencies of the structural models, "Non Structural Models" of competitive behaviour have been developed. These "New Empirical
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Industrial Organization" approaches such as the Panzar and Rosse (P-R) model measure competition and emphasize the analysis of the competitive conduct of banks without using explicit information about the structure of the market.
This study employs the "Non-Structural Model" approach suggested by Rosse and Panzar (1977) and Rosse (1982, 1987 ), so-called "H statistic", which has been widely employed in the examination of the competitive structure of the banking industry in various countries. The method developed by Panzar and Rosse (1987) determines the competitive behaviour of banks on the basis of the comparative static properties of reduced-form revenue equations based on cross-section data.
Panzar and Rosse (P-R) show that if their method is to yield plausible results, banks must also be in long-term equilibrium (i.e. the number of banks needs to be endogenous to the model) while the performance of banks needs to be influenced by the actions of other market participants. 5 The increased probability of systemic risk associated with concentrated markets has been formally
De Bandt and Davis (2000) show that the P-R approach require a number of working assumptions. First, banks must be treated as single product firms (an assumption that is more tenable for the GCC countries than for the developed economies). Consistent with the intermediation approach to banking, banks are viewed as producing intermediation services using labour, physical capital, and financial capital as inputs. Second, higher input prices must not be correlated with higher quality services that generate higher revenues, because such a correlation would bias the computed H statistic. This means, however, that if one rejects the hypothesis of a contestable competitive market, this bias cannot be too large (Molyneux et al., 1996b) . Third, banks must be in long-run equilibrium.
Studies of the banking industry have seen an increase in the application of the Panzar-Rosse methodology 7 . Table 3 summarises the results of those investigations.
Most of them are for European countries and indicate that banks earn revenues as if they are under conditions of monopolistic competition. Shaffer (1982) 1979 New York monopolistic competition Nathan and Neave (1989 ) 1982 -84 Canada 1982 1983 -84: monopolistic comp. Lloyd-Williams et al. (1991 1986-88 Japan monopoly Molyneux et al. (1994) 1986-89 France, Germany, Italy, Spain, UK mon.: Italy; mon. comp.: France, Germany, Spain, UK Vesala (1995) 1985-92 Finland monopolistic competition for all but two years Molyneux et al. (1996b) 1986-88 Japan monopoly Coccorese (1998) 1988-96 Italy monopolistic competition Rime (1999) 1987-94 Switzerland monopolistic competition Hondroyiannis et al. (1999) 1993-95 Greece monopolistic competition Bikker & Groeneveld (2000) 1989-96 15 EU countries monopolistic competition De Bandt and Davis (2000) 1992-96 France, Germany and Italy large banks: mon. comp. in all countries; small banks: mon. comp. in Italy, monopoly in France, Germany Bikker and Haaf (2002) 1988-98 23 OECD countries monopolistic competition Hempell (2002) 1993-98 Germany Monopolistic competition
shown by Shaffer (1994) 6 Not to be confused with the notion of a 'structural model' in econometric modelling. 7 The first application was by Rosse and Panzar (1977) , who employed a cross-section of data in order to estimate the H-statistic for the newspaper firms in the local media markets.
Coccorese (2004) 1997-99 Italy monopolistic competition Following Shaffer (1982 , 1985 , Nathan and Neave (1989) , Molyneux et al. (1994) and Hondroyiannis et al. (1999) , we estimate the following bank revenue function (equation (1) 
RISKASS
Ratio of Provisions to total assets
ASSET
Bank total assets
BR
Ratio of number of branches of a bank to the total number of branches per country
The H-statistic value is the sum of the factor price elasticity: PL, PK, and PF. In long-run equilibrium, rates of return should be uncorrelated with input prices. To test if the banking market is in long-run equilibrium we also estimate the auxiliary equation (2), which tests for the equality of risk-adjusted rates of return across banks. = 0, this implies that the banking market is in long-run equilibrium. If rejected, the market is assumed not to be in equilibrium 10 . It should be noted that equilibrium does not mean that competitive conditions are not allowed to change during the sample period. It only implies that changes in banking are taken as gradual.
BR ASSET
RISKASS
9 See Rosse and Panzar 1997; Rosse 1982, 1987; Shaffer 1982 Shaffer , 1983 Nathan and Neave 1989 . Also Coccorese (1998).
Empirical results
This study covers 52 banks privately held and domestically owned that are fully licensed commercial. The independent variables are chosen to account for firm specific and market specific factors 11 . Bank specific risk is measured by the ratio of provisions to total assets (RISKASS) 12 . We expect the effect of RISKASS on revenue to be positive since higher provisions are associated with higher risk and higher expected return. Second, total assets, (ASSET) are included in the analysis to account for possible scale economies 13 . Third, the ratio of each bank's branches to total branches in the country, (BR), is used as a proxy for banks' market share. Finally, PL, PK and PF are variables of the unit prices of the inputs of the banks: labour, capital and funds or proxies of these prices.
The nature of estimation of the H-statistic means that we are especially interested in understanding how total revenues react to variations in the factor prices, PL, PK and PF. Based on the measures of HHI and CRk as shown at table 2, we 10 See Shaffer (1982) for the origination of this test and more recently for its application Molyneux et al. (1996b) ; Hondroyiannis et al. (1999); and Claessens and Laeven 2004) 11 See Nathan and Neave, (1989) , Molyneux et al., (1994) , Hondroyiannis et al., 1999 12 See also Coccorese (2004) expect that the H values for testing the competitive conditions in the GCC are greater than zero and less than one. It is, therefore, hypothesised that the banks in the GCC operate under conditions of monopolistic competition.
The empirical results for the aggregated country-pooled data are reported in table 4. A test for the country fixed effects specification versus pooled rejected the pooled specification (F test for lnTREV was 22.92, and for ln(1+ROA) was 6.95 both greater than the critical value of 2.21) . The sign on ASSETS suggests that as a whole the banking market in the GCC faces diseconomies of scale, whereas there are significant market share effects as suggested by the positive effect of BR on revenue per asset. The effect of RISKAS on revenue is positive as expected and indicates that greater risk is associated with higher revenue. On the fixed effects specification, the banking market is shown to be in long-run equilibrium and the Rosse-Panzar H Statistic indicates that the GCC banking market as a whole is operating under conditions of monopolistic competition.
While there are a number of advantages of using panel methods of estimation for the GCC as a whole, the rejection of the pooled specification raise the possibility that the country specific differences may disguise country-bank specific and competitive structure differences within the GCC. These potential differences are explored by estimating Rosse-Panzar H statistics for each country banking market. Table 5 shows the estimates of the Rosse-Panzar H statistic for each country banking market. The auxiliary equations that indicate long-run equilibrium for each country (not shown) confirm that the sum of the elasticities of factor prices is not significantly different from zero. Therefore we can think of the banking sector in each economy as being in long-run equilibrium.
The econometric results from Table 5 are mixed 14 . In general, the value of the H statistic is significantly determined except in the case of the UAE. The disaggregated picture of competitive conditions is not consistent within the GCC. The banking sectors in Bahrain and Qatar appear to operate in conditions of monopolistic competition, whereas Kuwait, Saudi Arabia appears to operate in conditions of perfect competition. Because the estimated value of H for UAE is not significantly different from 1 (F= 0.00), the UAE banking sector is also consistent with perfect competition. However, this interpretation is subject to the caveat that the value of H for UAE is not estimated with high precision. The estimated value of H for Oman is not significantly different from zero or, by continuity, from some small positive number;
we cannot reject the hypothesis of monopolistic competition for the Oman banking industry. Thus, the result of Oman should be considered "undetermined" rather than "monopoly".
The 
APPENDIX -Dynamic P-R Model
This appendix reports the results of a dynamic version of equation (1) 
The variables are as described in the text, 'i' represents the bank in each country, 't' represents time, and u is a random term. The H statistic is calculated as the sum of the input price elasticities given by:
Similarly the long-run equilibrium equation (2) was modified in the same way as above and described below, where ε is a random term.. Table 5 . In most cases the additional lags of input prices were statistically insignificant, except for Saudi Arabia. A variable deletion test on the additional lags of input was rejected for Saudi Arabia on a conventional 'F' test (second last row of Table A1 ). The lag of the unit price of labour and unit price of funds were both statistically significant at the conventional level. The sum of the elasticities of the current and lagged unit price of labour is similar to that of the partial elasticity on the unit price of labour shown in Table 5 , suggesting a distributive effect over a two-year period. The negative and significant coefficient on the lag of the unit price of funds suggests that in the case of Saudi Arabia there is a dynamic effect that indicates the presence of fixed-rate loans of greater than one-year maturity. All other variables have a similar effect on revenue as in Table 5 . Importantly, Table A1 does not alter the conclusion of the state of the banking market in each country as given in Table 5 .
